Motivation and Punishment of Referees in non-professional Football. An Analysis of existing Problems and the Development of Solution Strategies with particular Regard to the Principal-Agent Theory

Motivation and Punishment of Referees in non-professional Football

Table of Contents

1 Introduction

2 Problem and Methodology

2.1 Problem Definition and Relevance

2.2 Research Methods

3 Key Terms: Punishment and Motivation

3.1 Motivation

3.2 Punishment

4 Theoretical Background

4.1 The Principal-Agent Theory

4.2 The Deterrence Hypothesis

4.3 Motivation and Punishment in Scientific Literature

5 Referees in non-professional football – The District of Guetersloh

5.1 Facts and Figures

5.2 Organization

5.2.1 Structures

5.2.2 The Referee Constitution

5.2.3 Recruitment Process

5.2.4 Monthly Meetings and Annual Test

5.2.5 Referee Assignment Process

5.2.6 Remuneration

5.2.7 Promotion/Relegation

5.3 Display of the Problems

5.4 Hypotheses

5.4.1 Motivational Issues

5.4.2 Punishment/Fines

5.5 The Questionnaire Study

5.6 Results from the Questionnaire Study

5.6.1 Motivation

5.6.2 Monthly Meeting

5.6.3 Annual Test

5.6.4 Punishment and Fines

5.6.5 Coaching

5.6.6 Bribery / Game Manipulation

6 Case Solution

6.1 Missing Quantity of Referees

6.2 Missing Quality of Referee Aspirants

6.3 Unreliability of active Referees

6.4 Bribery and Game Manipulation

6.5 Motivation

6.5.1 Application of the Needs Hierarchy

6.5.2 Application of the Expectancy Theory

6.6 The Effectiveness of Punishment

6.6.1 Application of the Deterrence Hypothesis

6.6.2 Empirical Evidence

7 Critical Valuation

7.1 Assessment of the applied Theories

7.1.1 The Principal-Agent Theory

7.1.2 The Needs Hierarchy

7.1.3 The Expectancy Theory

7.1.4 The Deterrence Hypothesis

7.2 Assessment of the Empirical Study

8 Conclusion and Outlook

Bibliography

Appendix

List of Abbreviations

List of Figures