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Artificial Economics - The Generative Method in Economics
Cesáreo Hernández, Marta Posada Calvo, Adolfo López-Paredes
Verlag Springer-Verlag, 2010
ISBN 9783642029561 , 268 Seiten
Format PDF
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Acknowledgements
5
Preface
6
Contents
10
List of Contributors
17
Part I Macroeconomics
22
1 A Potential Disadvantage of a Low Interest Rate Policy: the Instability of Banks Liquidity
23
1.1 Introduction
23
1.2 The Bank
25
1.2.1 Profitability and Liquidity
26
1.2.2 An Idealization of the Bank Activity
26
1.2.3 The Lending Activity
27
1.3 Simulations
29
1.4 Comparative Static, Dynamics and Credit Rationing
31
1.5 Conclusions
32
References
33
2 Keynes in the Computer Laboratory. An Agent-Based Model with MEC, MPC, LP
35
2.1 Introduction
35
2.2 The Model
37
2.2.1 Methodological Premises
37
2.2.2 Modelling the Market Sentiment
38
2.2.3 The Marginal Efficiency of Capital
39
2.2.4 The Marginal Propensity to Consume
40
2.2.5 The Liquidity Preference
41
2.2.6 Aggregate Supply
42
2.3 Simulations Results
43
2.3.1 GDP Series
43
2.3.2 GDP and its Components
45
2.4 Conclusions
46
References
47
3 Pride and Prejudice on a Centralized Academic Labor Market
49
3.1 Introduction
49
3.2 Related Work
50
3.3 The French Academic Labor Market
51
3.3.1 The Hiring Process
51
3.3.2 Empirical Evidence
51
3.4 Academic Labor Market Modelling
52
3.4.1 Agent Preferences
52
3.4.2 Multi-Agent Based Model
52
3.4.2.1 Candidates
53
3.4.2.2 Universities
53
3.4.2.3 Interaction Rules
54
3.5 Simulation Results
54
3.5.1 Methodology and Experimental Settings
54
3.5.2 No Learning Setting
55
3.5.3 Learning Universities Setting
56
3.6 Conclusion
59
References
59
Part II Industrial Organization
61
4 U. S. Defense Market Concentration: An Analysis of the Period 1996–2006
62
4.1 Introduction
62
4.2 Analysis of U. S. Defense Market Structure 1996–2006
63
4.2.1 Data Sources
63
4.2.2 Market Description & Unique Factors
63
4.2.3 Results and Findings
65
4.3 Two Simple Computational Models
68
4.4 Conclusion and Further Research
70
References
71
5 Operator's Bidding Strategies in the Liberalized Italian Power Market
72
5.1 Introduction
72
5.2 ACE Model
74
5.2.1 Market Model
74
5.2.2 Grid Model
76
5.2.3 Agent Model
76
5.2.4 Learning Model
78
5.3 Results
79
5.4 Conclusions
83
References
84
6 Selection Processes in a Monopolistic Competition Market
86
6.1 Motivation
86
6.2 A Formal Model of a Differentiated Industry
87
6.2.1 Consumer Behavior
87
6.2.2 Evolutionary Firm Behavior
88
6.3 Selection and Monopolistic Competition
90
6.3.1 Homogeneous Product Competition
90
6.3.2 Differentiated Product Competition
91
6.3.3 Heterogeneity and Other Model Parameters
93
6.4 Conclusions
96
References
96
Part III Market Dynamics and Auctions
97
7 Symmetric Equilibria in Double Auctionswith Markdown Buyers and Markup Sellers
98
7.1 Introduction
98
7.2 The Model
99
7.2.1 The Environment
100
7.3 Call Market
100
7.3.1 General Markup and Markdown Coefficients
101
7.3.2 Ex Ante Equilibria
102
7.4 Bilateral Trading
103
7.5 Continuous Double Auction
104
7.6 Conclusions
109
References
109
8 Multi-Unit Auction Analysis by Means of Agent-Based Computational Economics
110
8.1 Introduction
110
8.2 The Ausubel Auction
112
8.3 The Agent-Based Model
113
8.4 The Experimental Results
114
8.4.1 Decreasing Marginal Values
114
8.4.2 Increasing Marginal Values
115
8.5 Conclusions
117
References
118
9 Social Learning and Pricing Obfuscation
119
9.1 Introduction
119
9.2 Model Architecture
121
9.2.1 Obfuscation Game and Dimensions of Intervention
121
9.2.2 Recursive Companies
122
9.2.3 Adaptive Customers
123
9.3 Experiments
124
9.3.1 Baseline Behaviors
125
9.3.2 Efficiency of Market Intervention
126
9.4 Conclusions
128
References
129
Part IV Finance
131
10 Mutual Funds Flows and the ``Sheriff of Nottingham'' Effect
132
10.1 Introduction
132
10.2 A Simple Example and One Analytical Result
134
10.3 A Computational Model
137
10.3.1 Results
138
10.4 Conclusion
142
References
143
11 Foundations for a Framework for Multiagent-Based Simulation of Macrohistorical Episodes in Financial Markets
144
11.1 Introduction
144
11.2 What is Wrong with MABS?
145
11.2.1 Barriers to MABS for Macrohistorial Researchin Finance
146
11.3 Proposal for a MABS Framework
150
11.3.1 A Bird's Eye View of the Framework
151
11.3.2 The Modelling Process
154
11.4 Conclusions
157
References
158
12 Explaining Equity Excess Return by Means of an Agent-Based Financial Market
160
12.1 Introduction
161
12.2 The Model
162
12.2.1 Firms
162
12.2.2 Households
163
12.2.3 The Banking Sector
165
12.2.4 The Government
166
12.3 Simulation Results
166
12.4 Conclusions
169
References
171
Part V Financial Markets
172
13 Bubble and Crash in the Artificial Financial Market
173
13.1 Introduction
173
13.2 An Artificial Financial Market
174
13.2.1 Market Settings
174
13.2.2 Trading Agents
176
13.2.2.1 Expectation formation and time discounting
176
13.2.2.2 The Algorithm for Buying and Selling Decision-Making
177
13.2.3 Transaction System
178
13.3 Results
179
13.3.1 Simulation Results
179
13.3.2 Definition of Price Bubble
180
13.3.3 Sensibility Analysis
183
13.4 Conclusion
183
References
184
14 Computation of the Ex-Post Optimal Strategy for the Trading of a Single Financial Asset
185
14.1 Introduction
185
14.2 Elements of the Game and Formalizations
187
14.2.1 Initial Simplification
188
14.2.2 A Linear Programming Method For the Identification of S*
190
14.2.3 Embedding the Identification of S* in aGraph Structure
191
14.2.4 The S*-determination Algorithm
193
14.3 Numerical Illustrations and Conclusive Remarks
195
References
198
15 A Generative Approach on the Relationship between Trading Volume, Prices, Returns and Volatility of Financial Assets
199
15.1 Introduction
199
15.2 Historical Precedents and Motivation
200
15.3 Methodology
201
15.3.1 The ISS-ASM Model
202
15.3.2 Dataset.
203
15.3.3 Cross-Correlations and Causal Relation
203
15.4 Conclusions - Results
203
15.4.1 Price-Volume Relationship
204
15.4.2 Return-Volume Relationship
205
15.4.3 Volatility-Volume Relationship
206
15.4.4 Causal Relationship
207
15.5 Summary
209
References
209
Part VI Information and Learning
211
16 Comparing Laboratory Experiments and Agent-Based Simulations: The Value of Information and Market Efficiency in a Market with Asymmetric Information
212
16.1 Introduction
212
16.2 Market Model
213
16.3 Experimental Implementation and Simulation
214
16.4 Results
216
16.4.1 Distribution of Returns
216
16.4.2 Market Efficiency
220
16.5 Conclusion
222
References
222
17 Asset Return Dynamics under Alternative Learning Schemes
224
17.1 Introduction
224
17.2 The Model
226
17.2.1 The Market Setting
226
17.2.2 The Portfolio Model
227
17.2.3 The Learning Process
227
17.2.3.1 The IID Setting
227
17.2.3.2 The HMM Setting
228
17.2.4 Statistical Measures of Population Heterogeneity
229
17.3 Calibration and Results
230
17.3.1 Simulation Parameters
230
17.3.2 Comparison between the Learning Models
231
References
235
18 An Attempt to Integrate Path-Dependencyin a Learning Model
236
18.1 Introduction
236
18.2 Study of CPR Based on Information Issue
238
18.2.1 Lack of Information and Over-Exploitation
238
18.2.2 Dealing with Scarce Information in ABM
238
18.3 The Model
240
18.3.1 Main Assumptions and General Framework
240
18.3.2 Resource Dynamics and Probabilistic Choice of Effort
240
18.4 Simulations
242
18.5 Results
243
18.6 Discussions
244
18.7 Conclusion
245
References
246
Part VII Methodological Issues
248
19 A Model-to-Model Analysis of the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma: Genetic Algorithms vs. Evolutionary Dynamics
249
19.1 Introduction
249
19.2 The Analytical Model
250
19.2.1 The Replicator Dynamics Analysis
251
19.3 The Computational Model
253
19.4 Conclusions
255
References
256
20 Impact of Tag Recognition in Economic Decisions
257
20.1 Introduction
257
20.2 Cognitive Foundations
258
20.3 The Model
259
20.4 The Model with One Agent Type
260
20.4.1 Replication
260
20.4.2 Introduction of a New Decision Rule
263
20.4.3 Introduction of a Variable Payoff Matrix
263
20.5 The Model with Two Agent Types (the ``Tag'' Model)
266
20.6 Conclusions
267
References
267
21 Simulation of Effects of Culture on Trade Partner Selection
269
21.1 Introduction
269
21.2 Hofstede's Dimensions and Trade Partner Selection
271
21.3 Representation in Agents
272
21.4 Simulation Results
275
21.5 Conclusion
277
References
279