International Yearbook for Hermeneutics

Internationales Jahrbuch für Hermeneutik

Focus: Hermeneutics and the Performing Arts
Schwerpunkt: Die Hermeneutik und die darstellenden Künste

16 · 2017

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Mohr Siebeck

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Dance, a word

by

Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback (Södertörn University)

On the 1st of October 1649, René Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, arrived in Stockholm. He was the guest of Christina, queen of Sweden, at the time one of the most powerful countries on earth. Christina was 22 years old, Descartes 53. She asked – indeed ordered – Descartes to write the verses for a ballet with the title *La Naissance de la Paix*, (*The Birth of Peace*).[1] It was partly meant to celebrate Christina's 23rd birthday, but above all the end of the Thirty Years' War and the birth of an era of peace – under the might of Sweden, of course. Christina danced the role of Pallas Athena in the ballet that was performed in Stockholm on December 9th of the same year. On the 1st of February 1650, Descartes died due to the very hard winter in a land that he described as 'filled with ice and bears'. Still, it is not certain whether Descartes was the real author of the verses that comprise *The Birth of Peace*. In either case, the ballet presents an interesting choreography of peace as a kind of counter-point to the spectacular movements of the war. I will not analyze this graceful piece of performative poetry from the beginning of the baroque, which is full of curious philosophical and historical references and of aesthetic particularities. Instead, I want to take it as an inspiration to consider how the word dance could be woven together with politics. Thus the demand of Christina, that is, of politics, to weave, that is, to compose a dance, presents the demand of weaving dance into politics and politics into dance. This demand is even more at play today, not only in relation to dance but to all arts. The *horizon* for the reflection that I will propose here about dance is therefore the question about the "truth" of the relation between art and politics.

In the beginning there are words: at least some; words such as "weaving", "politics", and "dance". To weave means to form by interlacing yarns, to

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[1] Richard Watson, Descartes's Ballet. His Doctrine and his political Philosophy, Indiana 2007.

compose a whole by twisting and turning threads. The turning and twisting can be tight or loose but it does not prohibit the undoing of the done. This was the cleverness of Penelope who, waiting for the return of sovereignty in and of the city – I mean Ulysses –, spent the days untwisting twisted yarns, unweaving woven threads, undoing the done, again and again. The Greek word used by Homer for unweaving the woven was *analysis*, a noun derived from the verb ἀναλύω, to untwist. In this ancient pre-philosophical use, analysis means to unweave and untwist, a word that underlies the prefix *ana* – which means upwards – the ascendant gesture of the hand in this undoing and doing again. Penelope's unweaving of the woven presents the *politics of waiting*. Indeed, living in the house occupied by politicians undermining politics, she was waiting for politics to come back, suffering the uncertainty of every waiting, the uncertainty of whether the "to come" itself would come back or not. Penelope's politics of waiting is a *politics of analysis*, in this for us odd old sense of unweaving and weaving back, untwisting and twisting back, as waves in the sea. The politics of analysis, woven by Penelope, is also the *politics of rhythm*, the rhythm of unbinding bounds and binding the unbounded. Penelope's politics of waiting through the rhythm of analysis was her response not only to the abuse of politicians but even to the abuse of discourses on politics and maybe also to the abuse of politics itself, of politics undermining politics. Unbinding bounds and binding the unbounded in one and the same fabric, undoing the done and doing the undone, the hands of Penelope must ascend and descend.

Ascending from the fabric, they leave the woven in a leap, that is, for a short time, in a cut of time, for they have to descend back to the fabric, that is, to the fixed. The leaps of Penelope's hands, their rhythmical movement of ascending and descending, of weaving and unweaving are not harmonious; these leaps of the hands quiver and tremble before the self-undermining of politics and the uncertainty of the return of politics. To quiver and tremble is the most probable origin of the word *dance*, which philologists today agree is derived from the old Frankish word *dintjan*, meaning quivering and trembling. This old word from the language of German tribes that during the 5th and 6th century occupied Gaul was transformed by centuries of accents into the old French word *dancier*, later *danse*. In leaps of quivering and trembling, necessary for accomplishing this untiring unweaving of the woven and weaving of the unwoven, Penelope's hands dance. They dance with threads and cords. They dance in the tension between the fixed and the unfixed. They dance.

To dance with threads and cords in the tension between the fixed and the unfixed means to dance at the limits of dance, quivering and shivering before the possibility of no-dance. But what would no-dance be? Saying

dance, we hear movement. Would no-dance then mean no-movement? Not really, for what does not move can still move and moves still: as the earth under our feet that moves so slowly that for us it is the firmest ground; as stones that, not moving by themselves, can be moved by all that moves; as thoughts, these invisible movements that move and immobilize the world. These non-movements are rather non-moving movements than absence of movement. They show indeed how movement comprehends non-movement. If dance is movement and if movement comprehends non-movement, then we have to admit that dance is related to both movement and non-movement, in a specific way. T. S. Eliot described this specific way, the dancing way to relate to both movement and non-movement, with the following verses from the first of his *Four Quartets*:

> At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor fleshless;
> Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is,
> But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity,
> Where past and future are gathered. Neither movement from nor towards,
> Neither ascent nor decline. Except for the point, the still point,
> There would be no dance, and there is only the dance [2]

"Neither nor …" pronounces the rhythm of the tension between movement and non-movement, ascent and decline, from and towards, the "still point of the turning world". This still point, Eliot insists, is the point at which "there is only the dance" and without which there is no dance. No-dance would then be the absence of the "still point of the turning world".

Where there is restless movement, the "still point of the turning world" is lacking, movement moving itself all the time, moving more and more, forward and forward: This point is lacking where there is the *perpetuum mobile* of "appetency", on its "metalled ways of time past and time future",[3] to quote another verse from this quartet by Eliot. Restless movement is movement that turns against movement thus moving itself more and more all the time, movement saturating and undermining itself. Movement that only moves cannot move away from itself: here dance is no longer possible. Aristotle formulated the non-dancing principle of movement – that can also be called the principle of no-dance – when he described the primary motor of the universe as "unmoved mover" (οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ).[4] This is a difficult concept because it does not say that the principle that moves the universe, also called God, does not move. It says that the universe is moved by eternal and constant movement, by a movement that does not stop moving. For

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[2] Thomas S. Eliot, Burnt Norton, Four Quartets, in: Collected Poems (1909–1962), London / Boston 1963, p. 191.

[3] Eliot, Four Quartets, p. 193.

[4] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book λ.

Aristotle it would be a contradiction if the first movement wouldn't move at some point; that is why it has to move all the time. However, moving all the time, it does not move the very movement, as he otherwise would have called it "the unmoved mover". What Aristotle could not see, however, was that a movement that only moves, excluding from itself the tension with non–movement, is no longer movement, but fixity, movement fixed in movement. A movement that only moves, a constant and eternal move‐ment, not only contradicts but undermines itself, insofar as it eliminates the tension of contraries and oppositions that defines a movement. Eliminating the tension between movement and non–movement, constant and eternal movement excludes dance. A movement that only moves is nothing but a *status quo*, a state in which all contraries and oppositions become indistinct, equivalent and neutralized.

What Aristotle described as a dynamics of the universe, Karl Marx rec‐ognized as the universal dynamics of capitalism centuries later, a dynamics that becomes clearer and clearer in our global society. Thus capitalism can only become global and universal if movement moves all the time, more and more, faster and faster, saturating and undermining itself; Moving everything everywhere and all the time, faster and faster, global capitalism, to use the common label, imposes the prefix "re" onto every verb: it is the time of re‐volving, reevaluating, recirculating, relearning, retraining, recycling, review‐ing, repeating, renewing, rethinking, resaying, rereading, rewriting, moving everywhere and all the time the movement of everything. Because what is at stake is no longer the movement of things but the movement of movement, global capitalism produces and reproduces more than things: it produces productions, it reproduces reproduction, it represents representation etc. This absolute movement equals absolute fixity, thus a movement that cannot move away from moving is a movement that neutralizes the tension of con‐traries by means of voiding the meaning of tension. Here tension loses its meaning of relation, receiving only the meaning of equilibrium (*Ausgleich* in the language of Max Scheler) of equivalences.[5] The meaning of tension be‐comes void when determinations become indeterminate, when differences become undifferentiated, when oppositions and contradictions become ambiguous. Marx showed very clearly that this is what money does. As "the existing and active concept of value",[6] money is the principle of "general equivalence" because everything is reduced to the capitalistic value of value, to countable measure, that which, with Marx's own words, allows "the gen‐

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[5] Max Scheler, Der Mensch im Zeitalter des Ausgleichs (1927), in: Gesammelte Werke, Volume IX, Bern 1976, pp. 145–170.

[6] Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, quoted in: Paul Kottman (ed.), Philosophers on Shakespeare, Stanford 2009, p. 129.

eral confounding and confusing of all things – the world upside-down".[7] In this upside-down world of general equivalence,[8] everything can be anything else, in order to function as whatsoever for whomsoever and whenever. In this world, opposites appear as the same, all ties can be dissolved and tied in whatever manner, thus everything is already bound to money as 'the exiting and active concept of value'. Is not money both 'the bond of all bonds?' and the 'universal agent of separation?', Marx asks rhetorically in his readings of Shakespeare's *Timon of Athens*. Is not money the common unity of all differences, pure communication? In fact, it is the unmoved mover itself, that which cannot move away from its movement, the movement totally bound to its moving and in such a way that its absolute movement excludes every possible still point of a turning world. In this world of absolute movement, there is but absolute fixity. Indeed there is global asphyxia, impossibility to breathe. It is a world of no-dance, a world without no-movement, in tension with which a still point of a turning world would appear. A world totally bound to its bounds, moving the movement, is a world that does not turn the world.

It seems that the Penelope of this world – the world in which absolute movement equals absolute fixity – is no longer a Penelope with unbound hands able to unweave the woven and weave the unwoven; the Penelope of this world, of our world, is rather a Penelope with bound hands, the female version of Prometheus bound. Indeed, the tragedy of *Prometheus Bound*, in its masterly poetic presentation by Aeschylus, is the tragedy of our time, maybe even more than the sublime *Antigone* and *Oedipus Rex*. It would not be possible to propose a line of interpretation for this tragedy in this text, but it is important to name the urgency of it. In the case of a Penelope with bound hands, a Penelope with a bound body, a female Prometheus – would it still be possible to dance? What kind of politics would that be? How to dance with bound hands, with bound bodies, with no-dance? Or should the word dance be left behind?

Our world, the world of no-dance, the world laboring all the time to eliminate the "still points of a turning world" seems to prefer to say choreography rather than dance. As is well known, the word choreography is formed by the combination of two old Greek words – χορός, χορεία which at first mean "choir" and only afterwards "dance", and γραφή, which means writing. Choreography becomes the contemporary meaning of dance when dance receives the post-World War compulsion to "self-ob-

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[7] Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 129.
[8] For an insightful analysis of Marx's notion of "general equivalence", cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, L'equivalence des catastrophes: après Fukushima, Paris 2012.

servation", to develop a language that would be able to say a word at the same time saying that and how the word is being said. William Forsythe compared choreography, that is dance, to a dictionary, that is, to a "book in which language describes itself".[9] The concept of choreography has been entangled with the choreography of its own concept, reproducing its own production; claimed as "responsibility" and "response" to the time – to the being-there of contemporaneity – choreographic self-observation performs how the conceptual "meta-narrative" of choreography becomes its own stage.[10] It is entangled with the search for a word that describes the word, a movement that describes the movement, an idea that describes the idea. In this sense, choreography is performative right from the beginning. As such it is twisted in its own twists, weaved in its own weaving. But why should these acts or praxes of self-observation, self-reflexivity, self-description – a word describing the word, a vision showing the vision, a movement making visible the movement, etc. – why should these self-referential acts be called writing? Does the contemporary preference for the word choreography, the contemporary tendency to leave the word dance behind, does it mean that dance becomes writing, that what is at stake here is the written word dance? How does dance become a written word? Should we paraphrase Beckett and say: write dance, no dance? Write about dance, no dance, say dance, no dance? But what is writing?

To write – to write means to grasp and seize by means of making an incision in a surface, in a stone, in a paper, in a ground. Plato claimed a philosophical politics of anti-writing, for writing was for him an act of oppression. Writing oppresses the fluidity and flexibility of the spoken and said, excluding its soul from it, that is, the accents and gestures of and in speech; it excludes the improvisation of talking, the bodily elements of the words, its theatrical and performative dimension. In the *Phaedrus*, he uses the image of the charioteer that bridles the horse to run only on the same path that it dug in the ground at the first round. Plato observes how writing bounds the event of meaning to a signification that can be fixed and repeated, becoming the only and true signification, the orthodoxy of official and public truths, either in the hard form of ideologically forcing truths or in the soft form of common sensual evidences. In the beginning of the Western culture of writing, Plato observed the danger of asphyxia that writing brings forth. Writing bounds the meaning and the senses to surfaces of materiality, to the fixed, that allows constancy and eternity by

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[9] WILLIAM FORSYTHE, Gutes Theater ganz anderer Art [Interview], in: Ballett International 7 (1984), pp. 8–9.

[10] JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir, Paris 1979.

means of repeatability. Through repetition the extraordinary becomes or-
dinary and the unacceptable accepted; states of exception become normal-
ity – "one gets used to it", to the uses and abuses of every use and abuse. "It
is written" – the phrase compels the "so it must be for it is written". Writ-
ing gives norms, installs normativity and produces normality, which can be
both salutary and mortal; for it is an instrument that can be used both for
legitimation of the abuses of power and for controlling the abusive power
of power. Writing is indeed the imprint of this ambiguity in historical and
cultural existence, for it legitimates both the legitimate and the illegitimate,
it both censures and denounces censorship, it both covers up and uncovers.
Moreover, when movements of the body and of the soul are written down
they can no longer be forgotten or remain unnoticeable; they become pub-
lic and accessible to everyone; in this sense, writing is a politics of memory
and a fundamental medium for the public sphere; at the same time, when
movements of the body and the soul are written down, they become fixed
into images of movements that tend to be forgotten, for they become a
kind of written unconscious. The written, then, produces oblivion: it draws
the attention to itself, so that the unwritten world steps out of the exis-
tential focus. The people of letters – *hommes et femmes des lettres* – tend to
forget life, to neglect the body, to encapsulate themselves in closed spaces,
bound to books and quotes, writing the written, quoting the quoted, in
endless repetition and self-reference. Writing becomes the medium for the
private against the public. What Plato complains about concerning writ-
ing is the way it fixes the unfixed-ness and flexibility of the movements of
the soul. For the power of the written lies precisely in its impossibility of
being undone. Indeed, Plato was the one who described his politics as a
politics of weaving; he used a different word than Homer put in the mouth of
Penelope; he used συμπλοκή for weaving, which means putting together.[11]
Plato's politics is a politics of weaving in the sense of putting together what
has been clearly distinguished, establishing a new community despite the
lack of common bonds. In Plato's state this has to be a constant process,
which means that what has been tied must keep the possibility of being
untied. To undo the done, to untie the tied, to unweave the woven is what
the written does not allow, and that is a major danger for Plato's writings.
Moreover, he criticizes writing for the same reasons he complains about
the body, as for Plato the body is the prison of the soul. His complaint
was not moral – even if it was later moralized by Christianity. It was rather
rational-mystical-cosmic, as for him soul, ψυχή, was pure movement and
hence what on principle could not be seized, grasped, touched, defined,

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[11] Cf. PLATO, The Statesman, 281a.

that is, bound. Pure movement thus lacks the boundaries of the body; it
thus also lacks visibility. For Plato absolute movement lacks the boundaries
of bounds, being pure unbounded-ness and freedom. Writing is for lan-
guage what the body is for the soul – a bond, a chain that restricts move-
ment that forces the force of movement to immobility and stagnation. At
the same time, Plato knew very well that souls are souls in bodies, celestial
and earthly; that movements are embodied movements, and that writing is
also creation – literature, poetry – indeed, Plato was himself a writer and a
poet. Literature, poetry is writing facing the evil of writing, admitting the
evil of literature itself, something that Georges Bataille showed so clearly
many centuries later.[12] Plato expelled the poets from his politics because
he wanted to protect the city against the danger of writing facing the evil
of writing that defines literature and poetry, so he chose the easy way: to
expel writing facing the evil of writing – but he exalted dance, holding that
among all the arts, dance is that which influences the soul most. Dancing is
for Plato divine in its nature and is the gift of the gods. Dancing shows body
becoming soul, the bonds and boundaries of the body becoming unbound.
For him the question was not about bound bodies but about the body as
bound and how movement has to be considered as essentially unbound.
Maybe the platonic utopia was the one of an unbound body, a body as
unbound as the sidereal space. Dancing shows how unbound the soul in a
body is, despite the bounds and boundaries of the body. Maybe it would
be possible to show that for Plato, dance is the prototype of philosophical
writing, for it would be able to show how unbound philosophical thought
can and should be despite the boundaries of a written text. We would
discover a Plato very close to Nietzsche's claim that philosophy must learn
to dance the thoughts,[13] and Marx's exclamation that the hardened social
relations shall be forced to dance in order to enable men to sing their own
melody out loud.[14]

   This platonic complaint against the bounds and boundaries of writing –
that is, of the body – is critique of how writing binds the force of moving
and movement that dwells in the words into unmoving and void words. He

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[12] Georges Bataille, La literature et le mal, Paris 1957, cf.: https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=-WiwNekNJGA&feature=share (page accessed January 27th 2017).

[13] Friedrich Nietzsche, Das Tanzlied, Also Sprach Zarathustra, in: Säntliche Werke,
Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. by Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari, Volume 4,
München 1988.

[14] "Man Muß jede Sphäre der deutschen Gesellschaft schildern, man muß diese ver-
steinerten Verhältnisse dadurch zum Tanzen zwingen, daß man ihre eigene Melodie
vorsingt", Karl Marx, Zur Kritik der Hegel'schen Rechts-Philosophie (1844), in: Phil-
osophische und ökonomische Schriften, ed. by Johannes Rohbeck and Peggy Breitenstein,
Stuttgart 2008, p. 13.

sees writing as the danger of self-bondage, of words losing their moving forces in becoming too bound to the force of binding and unbinding that words are – Plato was afraid that 'the rest would be nothing but words', words void of meaning. He was afraid to come to a point even more dangerous than the one of words and thoughts no longer being able to dance; he was afraid – I am talking of course about a Plato transgressing Platonism – that words would become words void of meaning. For Plato meaning has to have meaning.

In a world conducted by general equivalence, not only are words devoid of meaning but meaning itself seems to have lost its meaning; meanings become empty not simply when they become meaningless but when every meaning can mean anything whatsoever, circulating as coins of exchange; in this void of meaning, at the basis of general equivalence, meanings are void when words become nothing but words. We would need more time to indicate how this process of general equivalence of meanings, which constitutes the meaning of general equivalence, is related to writing.

Words become nothing but words. Dance is a word as any other word; it is a word without meaning, for its meaning depends on the system of values – on the system of legitimacy that allows one to say "this is" or "is not" dance – the critics, the media, the sponsors, the intellectuals, the dancers, the choreographers. *But maybe the lack and void of meaning of the word dance is the only place for dance, the only stage for dance*. Maybe it is only when the word dance means nothing that dance can be unbound from the bonds of the words, of the linear discursiveness of language fixed through writing and logography. Maybe only when the meaning of the words – and hence the meaning of the word dance – becomes empty, dance can appear as the fissure of language itself, as the movement that moves within and through the lack of words, of words voided of words. Say dance, no dance – to paraphrase Beckett again – but when dance means nothing it would perhaps be possible to dance and say nothing; it would perhaps be possible to dance the voiding of the words within the excess of the words.

The question would not be the one of giving back the/or/a meaning to the word dance but *to listen to the void* of the words and meanings as the birth of the meaning of dance. To listen to the void of meanings, to words meaning nothing but words – at stake here is a *politics of listening*. Not waiting for the sovereign to come back – but listening to how sovereignty undermines sovereignty, to how politics too undermines politics. To listen to how meaning is void and avoid meanings, to how words empty words, indicates a very difficult sense of distance; it indicates a distance without distance, a distance that cannot get a distance, that cannot lose the ground insofar as it is the listening of bound bodies, a listening of bound hands, the listening

of a Penelope bound. How to dance with bound hands? How do bound bodies move in dance?

A possible response to these questions could be illustrated with a quote about dance, extracted from Tsegawara Saburo's choreography *Bound / Absolute Zero*, based on the novel *Der Gefesselte* (*The Bound*) by the Austrian writer Ilse Aichinger.[15] In this piece we see a dance of bound hands trying to perform a central quote from Aichinger's novel that says: "the freedom he felt was having to adapt every twist and turn to the cord that bounds him – it was the freedom of the panther, of wild wolves and flowers swaying in the evening breeze."[16] Tsegawara's response is not really a response to the questions presented here, because he is listening to the meaning of the words of the text, being however deaf to the void of meaning from which this literary text emerges. He is too illustrative and mimetic in his attempts to conform to the text and dance with bound hands the boundaries of the historical body. We could try to answer these questions through bringing another work of art into the discussion, a work by the Brazilian artist Lygia Clark entitled *Nostalgia do corpo – objetos relacionais* (*Nostalgia of the Body – Relational Objects*) from 1968–88. In this work, a group of performers embody the being bound in a net of ropes, building a sense of the collective body through this relational "non-object" which is the interaction of the participants[17] among themselves and with the net. If we would do that, we would be mimetical and illustrative, bringing an image to illustrate a bound body. But at stake here is the listening to the void of the meaning of meaning itself as the birth of dance itself. This is a very difficult and demanding listening, a listening that demands dispossession of the self, dispossession of dance itself, an experience of the macabre, the macabre that is music itself, music, this grand macabre, the most extreme experience of the split of signification, of the void of the words, of no-thingness, as Emily Dickinson once wrote:

> By homely gift and hindered Words
> The human heart is told
> Of Nothing –
> "nothing" is the force
> That renovates the World[18]

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[15] Tsegawara Saburo, Bound / Absolute Zero, choreography, 2002, cf.: www.youtube.com/watch?v =2Ao_xqMXynl (page accessed on January 27th 2017).

[16] Ilse Aichinger, Der Gefesselte. Erzählungen 1,ed. by Richard Reichensperger, Frankfurt am Main 1967, p. 16.

[17] For a visual idea of Clark's work cf.: https://historiasdasartes.wordpress.com/2010/11/11/aula-24-o-corpo-nas-artes-contemporaneas/ (page accessed on January 27th 2017).

[18] Emily Dickinson, The Complete Poems, ed. by Thomas Johnson, Boston / Toronto 1960, nr. 1563, p. 650.

This listening to how sovereignty and politics undermines sovereignty and politics, this listening to "hindered Words", to the "homely gift", a gift that is also poison – the φάρμακον – this listening is demanding insofar as it demands attention to how language and writing, to how meaning interrupts itself in pauses, breathing and punctuations. Here the "volcanic of stillness" may be the heart.[19] At this point, a musical piece could be brought up, for the sake of bringing more clarity to central points of our discussion. I mean the opera *Le grand macabre* (*Mysteries of the Macabre*) by György Ligeti,[20] as performed by Barbara Hannigan.[21] Here we can hear how demanding it is to listen to this piece by Ligeti, thus this listening as such is music; music is nothing but listening. *The politics of listening* can be defined as the politics of music. In this piece, we can *see* listening and, listening, see how bound bodies and hands still dance. Not being able to raise and lower the hands, as Penelope used to do, and hence no longer able to unweave the woven and weave back the unwoven – in the very point where analysis seems exhausted, and the tissues and fabric of meanings appear split, in this very point of "volcanic stillness", the very bound hands "give traces in the air". They conduct the being conducted by the tension between movement and no-movement, between dance and no-dance. "To give traces in the air" – this is another quote, a Chinese one that the Swedish dancer and choreopoet Birgit Åkesson considers to be the only meaning of dance.[22] To give traces in the air – this would be another kind of writing, a writing that un-writes the writing and untraces the trace. For what do leaves in the air do if not untrace traces? – That could be called *choreopoetics* rather than choreography.[23] It would be a way to dance the word. And dance would appear as distance without distance; embodied listening in the night of unforeseen transitions.

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[19] DICKINSON, The Complete Poems, p. 650. Cf. also poems nr. 175, 601, 1146, 1677, 1705, and 1748.

[20] Cf. "Macabre", early 15th Century: "(danse) Macabré", "(dance) of Death (1376)", probably a translation from M.L. (Chorea) Machabaeorum, lit. "dance of the Maccabees" (leaders of the Jewish revolt against Syro-Hellens; see Maccabbees). The association with the dance of death seems to originate from vivid descriptions of the martyrdom of the Maccabees in the Apocryphal books. The abstracted sense of "gruesome" is first attested 1842 in French, 1889 in English.

[21] GYÖRGY LIGETI, Mysteries of the Macabre, opera in two acts, 1974–1977, revised version 1996, performed by Avanti! Chamber Orchestra, soprano and direction Barbara Hannigan, cf.: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ZKaMuALMMY (page accessed on January 27th 2017).

[22] BIRGIT ÅKESSON, Att ge spår i luften, Stockholm 1991.

[23] The thought of choreopoetics here sketched should be brought in conversation with John Sallis's thoughts on chorology (JOHN SALLIS, Chorology: on beginning in Plato's Timaeus, Bloomington 1999.) and also with discussions about the meaning of the tragic choir as we find it for instance in Hegel, Novalis, Schelling and Hölderlin.

Dance distancing from dance; dis-dancing the word dance; dancing the asphyxia of the words. In German we can say that in one word: *Dis-tanz*.

Summary

The present article discusses the relation between dance and choreography in times where choreography is performed as dance. It departs considering how the dance of choreography performs a certain understanding of the relation between art and politics and asks the question of whether there is still a place for dance in today's choreography of politics. It proposes a concept of choropoetics through which dance can appear as a performance of movement while in move, of movement moving us in itself.

Zusammenfassung

Der vorliegende Artikel erörtert das Verhältnis von Tanz und Choreographie, und zwar dann, wenn diese als Tanz aufgeführt wird. Zunächst erfolgt die Betrachtung der Art und Weise, wie das Tanzen von Choreographie ein gewisses Verständnis des Verhältnisses zwischen Kunst und Politik zur Umsetzung bringt. Sodann wird gefragt, ob in der heutigen politischen Choreographie noch Raum für Tanz bleibt. Der Aufsatz schlägt abschließend einen Begriff von Choreopoetik vor, mittels welchem der Tanz als eine Aufführung von bewegter Bewegung erscheinen kann, einer Bewegung, die – in sich selbst – uns zu bewegen vermag.

Gesture and Expression – Interrupting Lament's Repetition

Walter Benjamin and Sophocles' *Electra*

by

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While gesture is linked to interruption there are at least two ways in which interruption can be understood, and thus there are differing ways in which gestures are present.[1] And yet, that minimally twofold presence should not be construed as a complete separation. Modes of relation endure. Imbrication and intrication continue. The strategy of this paper is to take up and explore these differences, what will be understood as the constitutive differences at the heart of gesture. At stake within them is the relationship between gesture and normativity. Normativity, understood formally, involves a specific modality of repetition. What is given, given within a determined logic, unfolds in such a way that it is always the same as itself. Sameness inscribes change to the extent that change is explicable in terms of variation. In sum, normativity is the repetition of Sameness. Moreover, its repetition, assuming the naturalization of normativity, precludes that form of interruption in which the given would then be prefigured. The central figure guiding this approach is Walter Benjamin and specifically his engagement with Brecht on the topic of Epic Theatre. Benjamin's claim made in relation to 'epic

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[1] These pages are excised from an ongoing research project on gesture. Part of the supposition is that what marks the current philosophical predicament is the logic of the symbol becoming an impossible possibility. It is this undoing, the gradual fading of the symbol that gives acuity to gesture as a central philosophical or hermeneutic problem. This means of course that the gesture is defined by a relation to time rather than reduced to the history of the literal gesture. I want to thank the other participants of the *Hermeneutisches Kolloquium: Hermeneutics and the Performing Arts* held at Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies, July 1–3 2016 for their responses when I delivered the paper. I also wish to thank my colleague Dr. Eva Anagnostou-Laoutides for her incisive comments on an earlier version of this text.

theatre' is that it 'is gestural' (*ist gestisch*).[2] This description creates one of the parameters within which gesture is to be understood. Gesture in Benjamin's engagement is recast in terms of 'the interruption' (*die Unterbrechung*). As a result of this recasting, gesture then comes to have an important affinity to the work of the caesura that Benjamin will adopt, in part, from Hölderlin. (That adoption is however a sustained repositioning in which the Hölderlinian caesura present in the *Anmerkungen zum Oedipus* is able to be transformed, via reference to the 'expressionless' as the condition of expression, into what can be described as the Benjaminian caesura of allowing.) The caesura, therefore, is not just an interruption, it occasions. Hence, what is in fact transformed is the way 'the interruption' is understood.[3] Interruption can allow. Equally there can be a mere hiatus, met by closure. Staged here,

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[2] References to Walter Benjamin are WALTER BENJAMIN, Gesammelte Schriften (hereinafter: GS), edited by Rolf Tiedemann / Hermann Schweppenhäuser. Berlin 1980; WALTER BENJAMIN, Understanding Brecht, translated by Anna Bostock. London 1992. There is a wealth of important engagements with Benjamin's work on gesture. Amongst the most significant are: LUCIA RUPRECHT, Gesture. Interruption. Vibration: Rethinking Early Twentieth-Century Gestural Theory and Practice in Walter Benjamin, Rudolf von Laban, and Mary Wigman, in: Dance Research Journal 47/2 (2015), pp. 23–42. PATRICK PRIMAVESI, The Performance of Translation. Benjamin and Brecht on the Loss of Small Details, in: The Drama Review 43/4 (1999), pp. 53–59; CARRIE ASMAN, Return of the Sign to the Body: Benjamin and Gesture in the Age of Retheatricalization, in: Discourse 16/3 (1994), pp. 46–64; ELI FRIEDLANDER, The Photographic Gesture, in: Paragrana: Internationale Zeitschrift für Historische Anthropologie 23/1 (2014), pp. 46–55.

[3] I have tried to develop this conception of the caesura as integral to Benjamin's philosophical thinking of both history and the political in ANDREW BENJAMIN, Working with Walter Benjamin. Recovering a Political Philosophy, Edinburgh 2013. In regards to Hölderlin and the question of interruption in the passage from the *Remarks on Oedipus*, what is central is the following: "Der tragische Transport ist nemlich leer, und der ungebundenste.Dadurch wird in der rhythmischen Aufeinanderfolge der Vorstellungen, worinn der Transport sich darstellt, was man in Sylbenmaaße Cäsur heißt, das reine Wort, die gegenrhythmische Unterbrechung notwendig, um nemlich dem reißenden Wechsel der Vorstellungen, auf seinem Summum, so zu begegnen, daß alsdann nicht mehr der Wechsel der Vorstellung, sondern die Vorstellung selber erscheint." FRIEDRICH HÖLDERLIN, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band 10, München 2004, p. 155. Moreover, it would be in terms of the difference between the sense of 'the interruption' as it figures in Hölderlin to the use made of the same term by Benjamin in his interpretation of Brecht that it would be possible to begin to question the claim made by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe that tragedy can be thought as *la pensé spéculative*. Cf. PHILIPPE LACOUE-LABARTHE, L'imitation des modernes, Paris 1986, p. 39. What might also be questioned is the interpretation that reduces or equates all the extant Greek tragedies with a generalizable theory of tragedy. Strategies differ. The contentions made here concerning the *Electra* differ from arguments that could be adduced concerning Aeschylus and which would be arguments allowing for a fundamental difference between Sophocles' *Electra* and Aeschylus' *Oresteia*. To this end see the discussion of Aeschylus in: ANDREW BENJAMIN, Place, Commonality and Judgment: Continental Philosophy and the Ancient Greeks, London 2010.

once Benjamin's lead is followed, are the two possibilities within gesture. More is at stake, since these are also the two possibilities within interruption, and thus they are the two possibilities for repetition.

While questions of fidelity remain complex Giorgio Agamben interprets gesture in terms of "the communication of communicability", an interpretation that is assumed to recall Benjamin.[4] Gesture becomes "pure mediality" in Agamben's project. Agamben finds this position as much in Benjamin as he does in the image studies of Aby Warburg and the literary criticism of Max Kommerell.[5] For Kommerell pure gesture is *die reine Möglichkeit des Sprechens selbst*.[6] Gesture as 'pure possibility' is there in its separation from means / ends relations. As a result gesture becomes pure means. Hence Agamben writes: The gesture is the exhibition of mediality: it is the process of making a means visible as such.[7]

At this precise point the complexity inherent in the interpretation that gesture brings with it begins to emerge. For Benjamin the argument is going to be that gesture can function critically insofar as the interruption becomes that interruption of normativity where the latter is to be understood in terms of the repetition of Sameness. It is an interruption, therefore, that undoes the naturalization of normativity – especially its temporality, the temporality allowing the interarticulation of repetition and Sameness – and as a consequence of that interruption, normativity then reappears as semblance. There is a denaturing of 'nature', naturalism's undoing. It is essential to note that what occurs here is a reappearing. Appearing, again, for a moment, for the first time. Here is the emergence of the other possibility within repetition. Present therefore is a modality of repetition that has to be thought in terms

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[4] Giorgio Agamben, Means without Ends, translated by Vincenzo Binetti / Cesare Casarino, Minneapolis 2000, p. 58. The significance of Agamben's work cannot be overstated. He remains central to any engagement with a wealth of topics, gesture included. The point of disagreement is, however, precise. In William Watkin's exact formulation, what is fundamental to Agamben is 'the inoperativity at the heart of a concept as a positive potential'. It is this point that is being challenged here. It is a challenge that yields a different conception of gesture. Cf. William Watkin, The Signature of All Things: Agamben's Philosophical Archaeology, in: MLN 129/1 (2014), p. 144.

[5] For an examination of Benjamin's relation to Kommerell and then the use made by Agamben of Kommerell in his own work on gesture, see respectively Eckart Goebel, Critique and Sacrifice: Benjamin-Kommerell, in: The German Quarterly 87/2 (2014), pp. 151–170 and Anthony Curtis Adler, The Intermedial Gesture: Agamben and Kommerell, in: Angelaki 12/3 (2007), pp. 57–64. Agamben's interpretation has its most sustained formulation in Giorgo Agamben, Nymphs, New York 2013.

[6] Max Kommerell, Jean Paul, Berlin, 1977, p. 47. For a discussion of Agamben's writings on Kommerell see Giorgio Agamben, Kommerell, or on Gesture, in: Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, Stanford 1999, pp. 77–88.

[7] Giorgio Agamben, Means without Ends, translated by Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino, Minneapolis 2000, p. 57.

of difference rather than variety and therefore involving a fundamentally different sense of relationality. Hence this conception of the gesture is of necessity informed in advance since it is inscribed within the project of cessation that is, at the same time, an opening towards. As this is an opening that is not determined in advance by an already present image, this cessation can be understood as "destructive".[8] There is another project. It is that project's becoming possible. And yet, from within the purview of Agamben's interpretation, gesture could not have been informed in advance. Its potentiality lies in its purity. (While pure form or "pure mediality" becomes a central concern, it is based on an impossibility: namely, that there could a "process" that both "makes visible" and which is simultaneously uninformed.)

Allowing for gesture, and thus within what gestures allows, there is always the other direction that can be followed. This direction is given by gesture's other possibility, namely, that gesture, even though present as interruption, can still occur in a setting where normativity is both retained and reinforced. It is retained, reinforced and then repeated as such, comprising a specific modality of repetition. Moreover, it is not just that this takes place despite the presence of an interruption; it is able to incorporate a form of interruption within it. The overall position therefore, as has already been suggested, is that gesture is defined by an ineliminable doubling. Part of the project of this paper therefore is to investigate gesture's doubled presence – a doubling that is pervasive since it is also there within both interruption and repetition, and therefore has to be taken into consideration in any engagement with the work of interruption and repetition. (Apparently singular terms never have singular designations.) A further consequence of this pervasive presence is that it simultaneously casts doubt upon any possible identification of gesture with "pure mediality". The necessity for the latter form of questioning is reinforced by having to allow for that other possibility within gesture, namely, the possibility in which gesture remains open to forms of recuperation. The latter is the presence of a mode of interruption that while holding open the possibility of the repetition of the Same faltering, nonetheless reverts back to the setting in which that repetition still endures. This position, which is again the doubling within gesture, will be both developed and clarified in what follows.

Benjamin's texts on *Epic Theatre* are not ends in themselves. Their significance lies in their capacity to occasion. Engaging the relationship between

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[8] The reference here is of course to Benjamin's text, The Destructive Character. Cf. Walter Benjamin, Selected Writing, Volume 2, 1927–1934, edited by Michael W. Jennings / Howard Eiland / Gary Smith, Cambridge 1999, pp. 541–542. For an important discussion of this text cf. Maria Teresa Costa, Walter Benjamin: A New Positive Concept of Destruction, in: Philosophy Study 1/2 (2011), pp. 150–158.

gesture and normativity, a relation whose originality complicates Agamben's approach to gesture, I will begin here by noting the presence of the interplay of continuity and interruption, interruption in its always possible doubled configuration, in Sophocles' *Electra*.[9] That interplay is itself the setting in which interruption and repetition figure and set in play the possibility of a reconfiguring, a reconfiguration that is not abstract. It pertains precisely to the narrative of revenge that organizes the *Electra* as a whole. That organisation is the way a specific version of normativity is organized with the theatrical work. More generally of course tragedy allows a way into gesture's doubled presence, a doubling that continues to be defined in terms of modes of repetition. Repetition divides between the insistence of continuity and thus of the repetition of the Same, in the first instance, and then in the second that which takes place again for the first time. Within this context the choice of tragic drama is far from serendipitous. Benjamin provides a clear way of distinguishing the epic from the tragic:

Epic theater and tragic theater have a very different alliance with the passing of time (*ganz andere Art mit dem Zeitverlaufe*). Because the suspense concerns less the end than the separate events, epic theatre can span very expansive periods of time (*kann es die weitesten Zeiträume überspannen*). This was once equally true of the mystery play. The dramaturgy of *Oedipus* or *The Wild Duck* is at the opposite pole to that of epic theatre.[10]

What this passage makes clear is that the difference hinges on the movement of time and thus time's relation to differing possibilities within repetition. Hence it is always times in the plural and modalities of repetition. The plural will always take precedence over the simply singular. While the question of the different senses of the 'passing of time' (*der Zeitverlaufe*) needs to be addressed, it is time, both generally and specifically, that allows for a way into the complex interplay of gesture, repetition and the body within the *Electra*.

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Time, more precisely the inherent plurality of times, play a determining role in the play. The narrative of revenge is itself timed in advance. Within this setting Electra appears at an early stage lamenting.[11] When she first appears she evinces a form of lament that brooks no end: 'But never will I end

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[9] All references to the *Electra* are to the Loeb edition, translated by Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1997. Occasionally translations have been slightly modified for argumentative consistency.

[10] Benjamin, GS, p. 533; Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, pp. 16–17.

[11] For an interpretation of lament that locates it squarely within the structure of what will be described here as the revenge narrative cf. Casey Dué, Lament as Speech Act

from cries and bitter lamentation,' (ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν δὴ λήξω θρήνων στυγερῶν τε γόων, 104).

What is significant here is the use of the future tense λήξω. Lamenting will continue. Hence there is the question of the possibility of its cessation. Is this an impossible possibility?[12] The question that arises to be more precise concerns the interpretation of this specific usage of the future tense. Its use signals the possibility that a decision in the future – the future as a specific moment within time and thus there as the now of the decision, the future's now – will bring lamenting to an end. Were this to be the case, the contention then has to be that the play's end – perhaps in both senses of end – needs to be defined in terms of the absorption of the future. The play cannot end open ended. Indeed, the Chorus a few lines later, in warning against excessive lamentation, describes time as that which allows for lamenting to end. Their formulation, one in which at key moments, sound and meaning cannot be separated, interconnects time with a warning against excess.

Don't suffer excessively (ὑπεραλγέω) nor be excessively angry (ὑπεράχθομαι) to those you hate, nor forgetful of them, since Time is a god who brings ease (χρόνος γὰρ εὐμαρὴς θεός, 176–179) .

Within this precise context what would bring an end to lamenting would be a set of normative constraints. Time here (χρόνος) operates within them and Time as a deity acts for them. Moreover, these constraints reinforce the subject's place within a set of conventions where it would be precisely those conventions that would sanction the delimitation and thus necessary restriction of excess. This amounts to the imposition of normativity as both form and content. Again the Chorus figures importantly in the staging of this sense of time's movement. After having listened to Electra outline the thinking behind her actions, the Chorus responds. Their response is directed to Chrysothemis. They speak of Electra.

πρὸς εὐσέβειαν ἡ κόρη λέγει: σὺ δέ, εἰ σωφρονήσεις, ὦ φίλη, δράσεις τάδε.

The girl's words show reverence to the Gods. If you are wise my dear you will do this.

This formulation is one to which Chrysothemis herself responds by deploying a similar form of language:

I will act thus, when an act conforms to conventions then it is not reasonable that two are in conflict, rather they should hasten to the act (δράσω: τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐχ ἔχει λόγον δυοῖν ἐρίζειν, ἀλλ' ἐπισπεύδειν τὸ δρᾶν).

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in Sophocles, in: A Companion to Sophocles, edited by Kirk Ormand, Oxford 2012, pp. 236–250.

   [12] For a detailed discussion of the line cf. SARAH NOOTER, Language, Lamentation, and Power in Sophocles' 'Electra', in: Classical World 104/4 (2011), pp. 403–404.

Reverence towards the Gods demands a response that is linked to a form of moderating wisdom (σωφρονέω).[13] This wisdom is linked to the 'act' (δρᾶσις). Hence Chrysothemis begins by stating that she will act (δράσω), and adds that when an act accords with convention, e.g., when it is δίκαιος, then rather than there be 'strife' (ἐρίς), reason demands that the act be undertaken. It is essential to note the sequence here. εὐσέβεια linked to wisdom as a moderating force allows for actions that eliminate contestation as to their viability insofar as such actions conform to reason.[14] Here there is what might be described as an exactitude of movement, e.g., time, a sequence of occurrences. Time is evoked to allow for 'the passing of time'. There are, however, within the play's own sequential unfolding, suggestions of another possibility. Those other possibilities do not appear in another fold within that general unfolding. They are moments in which, if only for the moment, in the unfolding, thus within folding's continuity, the movement of unfolding is checked. If there are intimations of time's cessation, a break in time in which the hold of convention may have been suspended and what Benjamin will describe as a 'free hand' (*freie Hand)* emerges, then it takes place at a number of particular moments.[15] Such moments suspend the hold of wisdom and convention because they allow the body as a locus of affect to appear. For a moment another possibility for action is staged. What matters does so in this moment. This is of course the gesture. And yet, precisely because the gesture is doubled in advance, the gesture as interruption contains a structuring and original division. Hence the presence of gesture as interruption need not occasion a form of discontinuity freed from already determined expectations. Recuperation endures as a necessary and thus ineliminable possibility. The check brings with it the continual possibility of its coming to be checked.

At line 928, Electra tries to convince Chrysothemis that Orestes is indeed dead even though Chrysothemis has seen indications to the contrary. Elec-

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[13] For the complexities that attended the gendered nature of *sophrosyne* see, Helen F. North, The Mare, the Vixen, and the Bee: 'Sophrosyne' as the Virtue of Women in Antiquity, in: Illinois Classical Studies 2 (1977), pp. 35–48. For an overall account of σωφροσύνη set within the context of its centrality in Plato's *Charmides* cf. Thomas M. Tuozo, What's Wrong with these Cities? The Social Dimension of Sophrosyne in Plato's Charmides, in: Journal of the History of Philosophy 39/3 (2001), pp. 321–350. Tuozo makes the general claim that:

Sophrosyne, no matter what else it is involves a fundamentally social practice of self knowledge that promotes the self-knowledge of oneself and others, is the condition of the goodness of all other goods, and, in the best city for all other forms of social interaction, pp. 349–350.

[14] For a further elaboration of this point cf. L. MacLeod, Dolos and Dike in Sophokles ElectraLeiden 2001.

[15] Benjamin, GS, p. 520; Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, p. 3.

tra relays the reports that she has heard from one whom Electra describes as having been at the scene of his death. Chrysothemis responds: 'And where is he? Amazement steals over me.' (καὶ ποῦ 'στιν οὗτος; θαῦμά τοί μ' ὑπέρχεται.) Equally, when Electra confronts Orestes, though he is still to be recognized as such, a site of similar complexity occurs. Orestes, still disguised, hints. He suggests that he knows the truth concerning the survival, or not, of Orestes. Faced with the possibility of knowing – a knowledge that would be definitive one way or another – she responds deploying a formulation that reiterates both the structure, sound and in part the phraseology that Chrysothemis has already used: 'What is it, sir? Ah, how fear creeps over me!' (τί δ' ἔστιν, ὦ ξέν'; ὥς μ' ὑπέρχεται φόβος.)

These two lines, in their difference, still coincide. And this coincidence allows, if only momentarily, for an opening. The contention here is that both lines need to be read (and heard) as divided at the center.[16] The question mark that divides each of them has an obvious interrogative force, though equally, it stages an interruption. The question *qua* question can be incorporated into the narrative sequence, a sequence in which time and normative constraints are interarticulated. This is the question's logic: the logic of the revenge narrative. The interruption becomes the gesture precisely because what occurs after the question in these instances takes the form of an aside that holds itself apart from the logic of the question. It is a turning aside that gestures. Before pursuing this manifestation of the gesture, another instance in which the affected body figures needs to be noted. On this occasion it does not concern a question.

At 129–136 Electra appeals to the Chorus. As has been seen she makes it clear that she wishes to continue to lament. She finishes by imploring the Chorus. She adopts the position and language of the suppliant. Her final line is the following:

> Alas I beseech you.
> αἰαῖ, ἱκνοῦμαι.

What needs to be noted is that within this line, sound becomes word: αἰαῖ leads to ἱκνοῦμαι. The verb form ἱκνοῦμαι is connected euphonically to the sound. The αἰ continues to be repeated. In so doing, the word ἱκνοῦμαι now sounds, sounding again. One sounds in the other. Neither word nor sound is present here if presence is thought in terms of isolation. Hence, there can be no element of the formulation that is non-signifying; it is rather

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[16] While 'fear' (φόβος) maybe also be what David Konstan refers to as a tragic emotion, it is still the case that here fear, as it emerges in the context of this line, involves a splitting or tearing of the subject. For a general account of "tragic emotions" cf. DAVID KONSTAN, The Tragic Emotions, in: Comparative Drama 33/1 (1999), pp. 1–21.

that in play here are modes of signification with differing relations to the lexical. Hence, what is at work is a relation that holds difference in place while allowing its elements to cohere. The Chorus begins its response with the word ἀλλά ('but'). The euphony is interrupted. The interplay of sound and word, the earlier inmixing of the affective and the lexical is brought to an end. Electra's line reinforces the point that speech is not defined in relation to the mute, but rather is given in a complex set of relations between sound and word. The productive force of that relation is effaced the moment the word still sounds and thus that originary interplay is ended. Whatever potentialities this interruption had are overcome. If it can be argued that it is the interplay of word and sound that allows this line to create an opening, and thus to work as a gesture, to be a gesture, then the response by the Chorus closes that opening. Now quietened, the gesture ends. The interruption has been reincorporated. It will be the intensity of the subject of 'I beseech you', an intensity given by its harboring as much sound as it does word (the lexical) that yields intimations of a break and thus a coming apart. It is this break and thus division within the 'I' that takes place in the two asides noted above. There is an indeterminacy therefore at the center of this affected beseeching 'I'. The presence of sound is there in and as the opening provided by a separation from convention. Nonetheless, it is the emphatic ἀλλά ('but') that brings her back into line. Measure returns. The suspended moment is itself therefore now undone. Order is restored.

To allow lines 928 and 1112 to be read as staging two moments, the moment as gesture, means that an account needs to be provided of the interplay, a play of connection and separation, that they present. As already noted, each line opens with a question. Each question involves an attempt to incorporate the unknown or the uncertain, rendered known or certain, into the continuity of the narrative or to allow for the narrative's own driving force – e.g. the interplay of revenge and justice – to be reinforced if not secured by the addition of that information. To invoke Benjamin's formulation, this is how the 'passing of time' would be understood. Moreover, the subject asking the questions and the subjects to whom those questions are posed are defined by relations of continuity which are either there or sought. This is the movement of enforced and enforcing continuity. Either way they are the relations in which subjects are subjected to the continuity of constraints, which is itself the constraining of continuity.

In both instances after the question there is an aside. It is as though within that aside another body appears. And yet, what appears is neither the body as such nor a body that twists free. Rather, it is a body for which difference is given by the nature of the relation that it has to the subject who questions (and thus the one who has questioned). The aside allows for the emergence