Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE:EXPLANATION, PREDICTION, CONFIRMATION

Team A Formal Methods

THE NO MIRACLES INTUITION AND THE NO MIRACLES ARGUMENT

1. THE NO MIRACLES INTUITION

2. THE ‘NO MIRACLES ARGUMENT’

THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE NO MIRACLES ARGUMENT1

REFERENCES

CAUSATION, ASSOCIATION AND CONFIRMATION

ABSTRACT

1. INTRODUCTION

2. COHERENCE AS PROBABILISITIC ASSOCIATION

3. CONFIRMATION

4. CETERUS PARIBUS

5. FOCUSED CORRELATION

6. CAUSAL STRUCTURE

7. CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

AN OBJECTIVE BAYESIAN ACCOUNT OF CONFIRMATION

ABSTRACT

§1 CARNAPIAN CONFIRMATION

§2 THE BAYESIAN APPROACH TO CONFIRMATION

§3 LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE

§4 CARNAP'S RESOLUTION

§5 PROBLEMS WITH CARNAP'S RESOLUTION

§6 A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE

§7 THE BAYESIAN APPROACH REVISITED

§8 OBJECTIVE BAYESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

§9 OBJECTIVE BAYESIAN CONFIRMATION THEORY

BIBILIOGRAPHY

AN EXPLICATION OF THE USE OF INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION

1. PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF IBE

2. HEURISTICS

3. APPLYING THE LOGIC OF QUESTIONS: PRELIMINARIES

4. TWO COMPARATIVE CRITERIA OF EXPLANATORY POWER

5. APPLICATIONS TO SOME PERSISTENT QUESTIONS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

A FORMAL LOGIC FOR THE ABDUCTION OF SINGULAR HYPOTHESES1

1 INTRODUCTION

2 THE PROBLEM

3 MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF ABDUCTIVE REASONING

4 INFORMAL PRESENTATION OF THE LOGIC LArs

5 THE LOGIC LArs

6 CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS

PROBABILITIES IN BRANCHING STRUCTURES

REAL AND OTHER POSSIBILITIES

PROBABILITIES IN BRANCHING TIME

EXTENDING THE ACCOUNT: BRANCHING SPACE-TIMES

CONCLUSIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Team B Philosophy of the Natural and Life Sciences

CAUSALITY AND EXPLANATION: ISSUES FROM EPIDEMIOLOGY

1. EPIDEMIOLOGY PARADIGMS

2. OVERCOMING THE BLACK BOX PARADIGM. THE SEARCH FOR MECHANISMS

3. MECHANISTIC EXPLANATIONS OF LAYERED DISEASES

INVARIANCE, MECHANISMS AND EPIDEMIOLOGY

REFERENCES

WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE PRAGMATIC-ONTIC ACCOUNT OF MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION?

1. INTRODUCTION

2. WORRIES

3. CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

CAUSALITY AND EVIDENCE DISCOVERY IN EPIDEMIOLOGY

EXISTENCE AND CAUSALITY

NON-RANDOMISED EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES

CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

INFERENCES TO CAUSAL RELEVANCE FROM EXPERIMENTS

1 THEORY AND EXPERIENCE

2 CAUSAL ANALYSIS

2.1 Causal models

2.2 Theory of causal regularities

2.3 Principles of causal reasoning

2.3.1 Method of Difference

2.3.2 Assumptions

2.3.3 Inferring a causal factor

2.3.4 More complex designs

2.3.5 Other inference patterns

2.4 Difference tests in practice: notebook entries

3 METHODOLOGY OF CAUSAL MODELS

REFERENCES

COMPARING PART-WHOLE REDUCTIVE EXPLANATIONS IN BIOLOGY AND PHYSICS1

ABSTRACT

1. BIOLOGY, PHYSICS, AND NAGEL’S REDUCTIONIST SHADOW

2. TEMPORALITY IN PART-WHOLE REDUCTIVE EXPLANATIONS

2.1 Part-Whole Reductive Explanations

2.2 Temporality

3. COMPOSITION, CAUSATION, AND THE DIFFERENCE TIME MAKES

3.1 Composition and Causation

3.2 Intrinsicality and Fundamentality

4. EXAMPLES: PART-WHOLE REDUCTIVE EXPLANATIONS IN BIOLOGY AND PHYSICS

4.1 Ideal Crystal

4.2. Quantum-entanglement

4.3 Protein Folding

5. CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

THE ARRIVAL OF THE FITTEST

SOME HISTORICAL SCENE SETTING

MISLEADING METAPHORS

VARIATIONAL EXPLANATION AND FILTER DEVICES

SOLVING SOBER’S PROBLEM

REFERENCES

THE ARRIVAL OF THE FITTEST WHAT ?

ABSTRACT

1. INTRODUCTION: DOES SELECTION EXPLAIN THE ARRIVAL OF THE FITTEST?

2. THE SIEVE ANALOGY OF NATURAL SELECTION

3. TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SIEVE ANALOGY: A FALSE DICHOTOMY

4. WHAT NATURAL SELECTION EXPLAINS AND WHAT IT DOES NOT

REFERENCES

Team C Philosophy of theCultural and Social Sciences

NORMATIVITY IS THE KEY TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HUMAN AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES

1. WHERE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HUMAN AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES IS NOT

2. NORMATIVITY IN AN EXTERNAL AND AN INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE

3. HUMAN AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES DIFFER IN NORMATIVE INVOLVEMENT

4. IS METHODOLOGICAL DUALISM COMPATIBLE WITH ONTOLOGICAL MONISM?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

METHODOLOGICAL HIGHER-LEVEL INTERDISCIPLINARITY BY SCHEME-INTERPRETATIONISM: AGAINST METHODOLOGICAL SEPARATISM OF THE NATURAL, SOCIAL, AND HUMAN SCIENCES

I. INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN THE INFORMATION- ANDSYSTEMS TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD

II. THE TRADITIONAL “TWO CULTURES” PROBLEM

III. TYPES OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY

IV. TOWARDS A SYSTEMATIC SCHEME-INTERPRETATIONISM

V. INTERPRETATION AND HERMENEUTICS

EXPLANATION AND INTERPRETATION IN THE SCIENCES OF MAN

EXPLANATION AS AN ACT OF COMMUNICATION

EXPLANATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

INTERPRETATION IN CONTEXT

CONCLUSION

IMAGINATION AND EXPLANATION IN HISTORY

I. THE MOMENTS OF HISTORICAL MEMORY

1. Personal Memory

2. Interpretation of the Human Traces

3. The Capacity for Storytelling

4. The Connection of Personal Memory and Collective Memory

II. NEW LIGHT ON EXPLANATION

HISTORICAL NARRATIVES, EVIDENCE, AND EXPLANATIONS

HISTORICAL NARRATIVES AND EVIDENCE

THE LOGIC OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

SCIENTIFIC LAWS AND COMMON SENSE GENERALIZATIONS

HOLISTIC SOCIAL CAUSATION AND EXPLANATION

I. INTRODUCTION

II. INDIVIDUALISTIC VERSUS HOLISTIC PREDICATES AND CONCEPTS

III. THE SOCIAL CAUSATION PROBLEM

IV. ARGUING FOR HOLISTIC SOCIAL CAUSATION

V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND ARGUMENTS

COMPLEXITY IN ECONOMICS AND PREDICTION: THE ROLE OF PARSIMONIOUS FACTORS1

1. SOURCES OF COMPLEXITY FOR ECONOMIC PREDICTIONS

2. VARIETIES OF COMPLEXITY: FRAMEWORK AND DYNAMICS

2.1. Complex Framework and Complex Dynamics

2.2. Relevant Forms of Complexity

3. THE ROLE OF PARSIMONIOUS FACTORS

3.1. Identifi cation of Parsimonious Factors

3.2. Contribution of Parsimonious Factors

PREDICTION AND PRESCRIPTION IN THE SCIENCE OF THE ARTIFICIAL: INFORMATION SCIENCE AND COMPLEXITY1

1. COMPLEXITY IN DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS

1.1. Understanding the Complexity of a System

1.2. Interaction in the System

2. DIFFICULTIES FOR PREDICTION IN THE DESIGN OF INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS

2.1. Kinds of Uncertainty

2.2. Scientific Design and the Management of Uncertainty Problems

3. THE NEED FOR PRESCRIPTION IN AN INFORMATIVE ENVIRONMENT

3.1. Prescription in the “Inner” Level

3.2. The “Outer” Sphere of Prescriptions

Team D Philosophy of the Physical Sciences

AGAINST POINTILLISME: A CALL TO ARMS

ABSTRACT

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Five kinds of spatial extrinsicality

2.1 Avoiding controversy about the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction

2 THE WIDER CAMPAIGN AGAINST POINTILLISME

2.1.1 Distinction from three mathematical distinctions

2.2 Classical mechanics is not pointilliste

2.2.1 Two versions of pointillisme

2.2.2 Mechanics violates pointillisme as regards space

3 STRESS: EXTRINSICALITY FROM A TENSOR’S ORDER

3.1 The need for surface forces

3.2 The stress tensor

4 STRAIN: HAECCEITIST KINEMATICS

4.1 The description of deformations

4.2 The Cauchy-Green strain tensor

5 ELASTICITY: FURTHER ALONG THE SPECTRUM OF EXTRINSICALITY

6 CONCLUSION: YET MORE EXTRINSICALITY

REFERENCES

THE GIBBS PARADOX REVISITED

ABSTRACT

1 INTRODUCTION: THE GIBBS PARADOX

2 THE GIBBS PARADOX IN STATISTICAL MECHANICS

3 THE STATISTICAL MECHANICAL ENTROPY OF MIXING

4 A NEW DILEMMA: THE GIBBS PARADOX IN QUANTUM MECHANICS

5 HOW PARTICLES ARE TO BE REPRESENTED IN QUANTUM MECHANICS

6 PARTICLES AS EMERGENT ENTITIES

7 THE GIBBS PARADOX: CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE ALEXANDROFF PRESENT AND MINKOWSKI SPACETIME: WHY IT CANNOT DO WHAT IT HAS BEEN ASKED TO DO1

1 SAVITT’S TWO MOTIVATIONS FOR HAVING A PRESENT IN MINKOWSKI SPACETIME

2 ALEX’S FEATURES IN RELATION TO THE EXTENDED CHARACTER OF OUR EXPERIENCE

3 ALEX’S OSCILLATION BETWEEN ITS USELESSNESS IN PHYSICS AND ITS UNFAITHFULNESS TO OUR EXPERIENCE

4 THE PHYSICAL IRRELEVANCE OF ALEX

5 ANOTHER MODEL OF THE PRESENT OF OUR EXPERIENCE?

6 CONCLUSION

A LOCUS FOR “NOW”

ABSTRACT

1 MAIN INTUITION

1.1 Models of BST

1.2 Minkowskian Branching Structures (MBS)

2 WHAT DO THE PRESENTS LOOK LIKE?

3 DISCUSSION

REFERENCES

WEYL’S PRINCIPLE, COSMIC TIME AND QUANTUM FUNDAMENTALISM

ABSTRACT

1 INTRODUCTION

2 A VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF WEYL’S PRINCIPLE

3 WEYL’S PRINCIPLE IN STANDARD TEXTS ON COSMOLOGY

4 COSMIC TIME WITH QUANTUM MATTER?

REFERENCES

NOT THROWING OUT THE BABY WITH THE BATHWATER: BELL’S CONDITION OF LOCAL CAUSALITY MATHEMATICALLY ‘SHARP AND CLEAN’

ABSTRACT

I. INTRODUCTION

II. THE INTUITIVE IDEA: BELL’S LOCAL CAUSALITY

III. CLEANING UP THE INTUITIVE IDEA

IV. INTRODUCING MATHEMATICS: FORMALIZING SUFFICIENCY

V. THE BABY: BELL’S LOCAL CAUSALITY ‘MATHEMATICALLY SHARP AND CLEAN’

VI. NOT THROWING OUT THE BABY WITH THE BATHWATER

VII. ENVOI

REFERENCES

Team E History of the Philosophy of Science

KANT ON CHANCE AND EXPLANATION

1. INTRODUCTION

2. KANT ON CHANCE

3. THE CHANCE HYPOTHESIS

4. WHY IS CHANCE ILLEGITIMATE?

5. KANT ON SCIENTIFIC METHOD

6. CONCLUSION

SHIFTING THE (NON-RELATIVIZED) A PRIORI: HANS REICHENBACH ON CAUSALITY AND PROBABILITY (1915–1932)

1. TWO SYNTHETIC APRIORIS: THE EARLY REICHENBACH

2. YEARS OF TRANSITION: THE MID 1920S

3. INDUCTIVE INFERENCE AS AN A PRIORI

4. POST EMIGRATION: ABANDONING THE UNITY OF STATISTICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS

CARNAP’S THEORIES OF CONFIRMATION

THE RISE AND FALL OF FALSIFICATIONISM IN THE LIGHT OF NEURATH’S CRITICISM1

1. INTRODUCTION

2. THE CRITIQUE OF DOGMATIC FALSIFICATIONISM

3. THE DECISIONISM OF POPPER1

4. SOPHISTICATED FALSIFICATIONISM

5. THE REJECTION OF THE MAIN IDEAS OF FALSIFICATIONISM

6. CONCLUSION

PROBABILITY AND PRAGMATISM

1. FOREWORD

2. ABOUT PRAGMATISM

3. PEIRCE FORERUNNER OF THE PROPENSITY INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY

4. THE INFLUENCE OF PRAGMATISM ON HANS REICHENBACH

5. LEWIS’S INFLUENCE ON CARNAP

6. THE SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

RUSSELL ON NON-DEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

INTRODUCTION

1. THE PRINCIPLE OF INDUCTION

2. THE POSTULATES OF NON-DEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

3. KNOWLEDGE OF THE POSTULATES: HIGHER-ORDER NATURALISM?

4. THE LIMITS OF EMPIRICISM

EDGAR ZILSEL ON HISTORICAL LAWS

“EVERY SYSTEM OF SCIENTIFIC THEORY INVOLVES PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS” (TALCOTT PARSONS). THE SURPRISING WEBERIAN ROOTS TO MILTON FRIEDMAN’S METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

1. STIGLER’S INTEREST IN PARSONS

2. PARSONS AND CHICAGO

INDEX OF NAMES